Does clinical equipoise apply to cluster randomized trials in health research? by Binik, Ariella et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Does clinical equipoise apply to cluster
randomized trials in health research?
Ariella Binik
1, Charles Weijer
1,2,3*, Andrew D McRae
1,3,4, Jeremy M Grimshaw
5,6, Robert Boruch
7, Jamie C Brehaut
5,8,
Allan Donner
3,9, Martin P Eccles
10, Raphael Saginur
11, Monica Taljaard
5,8 and Merrick Zwarenstein
12
Abstract
This article is part of a series of papers examining ethical issues in cluster randomized trials (CRTs) in health
research. In the introductory paper in this series, Weijer and colleagues set out six areas of inquiry that must be
addressed if the cluster trial is to be set on a firm ethical foundation. This paper addresses the third of the
questions posed, namely, does clinical equipoise apply to CRTs in health research? The ethical principle of
beneficence is the moral obligation not to harm needlessly and, when possible, to promote the welfare of research
subjects. Two related ethical problems have been discussed in the CRT literature. First, are control groups that
receive only usual care unduly disadvantaged? Second, when accumulating data suggests the superiority of one
intervention in a trial, is there an ethical obligation to act?
In individually randomized trials involving patients, similar questions are addressed by the concept of clinical
equipoise, that is, the ethical requirement that, at the start of a trial, there be a state of honest, professional
disagreement in the community of expert practitioners as to the preferred treatment. Since CRTs may not involve
physician-researchers and patient-subjects, the applicability of clinical equipoise to CRTs is uncertain. Here we argue
that clinical equipoise may be usefully grounded in a trust relationship between the state and research subjects,
and, as a result, clinical equipoise is applicable to CRTs. Clinical equipoise is used to argue that control groups
receiving only usual care are not disadvantaged so long as the evidence supporting the experimental and control
interventions is such that experts would disagree as to which is preferred. Further, while data accumulating during
the course of a CRT may favor one intervention over another, clinical equipoise supports continuing the trial until
the results are likely to be broadly convincing, often coinciding with the planned completion of the trial. Finally,
clinical equipoise provides research ethics committees with formal and procedural guidelines that form an
important part of the assessment of the benefits and harms of CRTs in health research.
Introduction
This article is part of a series of papers examining ethical
issues in cluster randomized trials (CRTs) in health
research. CRTs are used increasingly in knowledge trans-
lation research, quality improvement research, commu-
nity based intervention studies, public health research,
and research in developing countries. While a small and
growing literature explores ethical aspects of CRTs, clus-
ter trials raise difficult issues that have not been
addressed adequately. In the introductory paper in this
series, Weijer and colleagues set out six areas of inquiry
that must be addressed if the cluster trial is to be set on a
firm ethical foundation [1]. These include identifying
research subjects, obtaining informed consent, the applic-
ability of clinical equipoise, benefit-harm analysis, the
role and authority of gatekeepers, and the protection of
vulnerable populations in CRTs. This paper addresses
the third of the questions posed, namely, does clinical
equipoise apply to CRTs in health research?
In the introductory paper of the series, Weijer and
colleagues set out a standard framework of research
ethics with four ethical principles: respect for persons,
beneficence, justice, and respect for communities [1].
Beneficence is the moral obligation not to harm need-
lessly, and when possible, to promote the welfare of
research subjects. In the context of clinical research,
beneficence gives rise to the moral obligation to provide
research subjects with a reasonable balance of harms
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balance of harms and benefits is one of the central chal-
lenges in research ethics oversight [2].
Evaluating the balance of harms and benefits raises
unique concerns for CRTs, which randomize groups or
intact social units rather than individual subjects. In
individually randomized controlled trials (RCTs), an
acceptable balance of harms and benefits relies, in part,
on the existence of clinical equipoise. Clinical equipoise
refers to a state of honest, professional disagreement
among the community of experts about the preferred
treatment [3]. While clinical equipoise is central to the
evaluation of harms and benefits in RCTs, its application
to CRTs is uncertain and requires specification. In the
following, we argue that clinical equipoise can be
applied to the resolution of ethical tensions in the
assessment of harms and benefits in CRTs.
We begin by identifying the central challenge in applying
clinical equipoise to CRTs. Clinical equipoise is commonly
understood as an ethical requirement emerging from the
trust relationship between physician-researchers and
patient-subjects. As such, the moral requirement for clini-
cal equipoise presupposes the existence of a relationship
between a physician-researcher and a patient-subject.
Unlike RCTs, CRTs often do not involve relationships
between physician-researchers and patient-subjects.
In CRTs, the units of randomization may be schools,
communities, or physician practices. As a result, clinical
equipoise is not obviously applicable to CRTs.
To resolve this problem, we identify a trust relation-
ship between the state and research subjects, in addition
to the widely recognized trust relationship between a
physician-researcher and the patient-subject. Recogniz-
ing clinical equipoise as emerging from the relationship
between the state and research subjects situates clinical
equipoise in a framework which can be applied to
harm-benefit assessments in CRTs.
Our analysis proceeds in the following six steps. First,
we identify difficulties associated with the evaluation of
harms and benefits in CRTs and explore their similarity
to ethical problems arising in RCTs. Second, we con-
sider the role of clinical equipoise in resolving tensions
associated with harm-benefit assessments in RCTs.
Third, we elucidate the difficulties associated with apply-
ing clinical equipoise to CRTs. Fourth, we critically ana-
lyze the solutions proposed for resolving ethical tensions
in CRTs. Fifth, we argue that recognizing a trust rela-
tionship between the state and research subjects pro-
vides a framework in which clinical equipoise can be
applied to CRTs. In the sixth and final section, we
explore the implications of implementing clinical equi-
poise as a moral requirement for CRTs with reference
to an example CRT.
Harm-benefit assessments in CRTs and RCTs
Harm-benefit assessments in CRTs
A widely recognized ethical principle requires that all
research offer participants a reasonable balance of harms
and benefits [4]. This moral requirement aims to ensure
that subjects will not be disadvantaged by their random
intervention assignment. While most agree that subjects
should not be disadvantaged by their random interven-
tion assignment, implementing this requirement raises
difficult ethical questions. For example, how should
harms and benefits be calculated? What constitutes an
acceptable balance of harms and benefits? What benefits,
if any, are owed to control group subjects? Are there cri-
teria for reviewing the acceptability of harm-benefit
assessments?
Currently, the intricacies of harm-benefit assessments
receive little attention in the literature on CRTs [5].
Most commentators overlook these difficulties and
those who raise problems with harm-benefit assessments
do not provide principled resolutions. Furthermore,
commentators have not adequately addressed whether
difficulties in harm-benefit assessments are unique to
CRTs or akin to those encountered in RCTs. In the fol-
lowing section, we identify the concerns associated with
harm-benefit assessments raised in the CRT literature
and consider whether these are unique to CRTs or
represent broader ethical concerns for clinical research
involving human subjects.
Two ethical problems associated with harm-benefit
assessments have been discussed in the CRT literature.
The first ethical concern addresses the morally appropri-
ate treatment of subjects in the control group of CRTs.
Commentators argue that exposing subjects in a control
group to an intervention hypothesized to be inferior or to
no intervention at all may violate the ethical require-
ments of beneficence [6,8]. Klar and Donner argue that
the considerable effort involved in participating in a CRT
should not be left uncompensated [8]. More specifically,
the ethical requirement to provide subjects with a rea-
sonable balance of harms and benefits may not be ful-
filled in CRTs in which control group subjects typically
“receive only usual care” [8]. Similarly, Glanz and collea-
gues argue that control group subjects “may be burdened
disproportionately by data collection requirements with-
out receiving the benefit of services or resources” [6]. In
other words, these authors raise concerns that the risks
of participating in the control group of a CRT, which
receives either no intervention or an intervention
hypothesized to be inferior, may not stand in reasonable
relation to the potential benefits of participation [6].
The second ethical concern arises from the prelimin-
ary results of a CRT, revealed during interim analysis
[6,7,9]. While a trial is underway, the accumulation of
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over another. Commentators on the ethics of CRTs are
concerned about the obligations of researchers when
faced with these interim results. Glanz and colleagues
argue that there is an ethical obligation to act on
interim findings. Interim analyses can bring to light
unforeseen and serious adverse effects or indicate that
one arm of the trial is superior. In the former case, it
would be unethical to continue the trial without modifi-
cation to the intervention and in the latter case, the pre-
ferable treatment should be offered to all groups or
individuals participating in the trial [6]. Another com-
mentator claims that the decision to terminate a trial
early based on interim findings is particularly compli-
cated in CRTs because the statistical inefficiency of the
cluster design complicates judgments about when suffi-
cient evidence exists to ascertain trial benefits or harms
[7].
Similar concerns in RCTs
The commentators raise important concerns associated
with harm-benefit assessments. A brief examination of
the early literature on the ethics of individually rando-
mized controlled trials reveals that the ethical concerns
described above are not unique to CRTs. Parallel ethical
concerns have been addressed with respect to RCTs.
For example, Ware (1989) raises concerns about the
ethical obligations of physician-researchers to subjects
when accumulating evidence suggests the superiority of
the experimental intervention. He argues that even though
evidence for the efficacy of extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation (ECMO), an experimental intervention for
the treatment of persistent pulmonary hypertension in
newborns, would have been stronger in a trial involving
concurrent control groups, ethical concerns led him to
select an adaptive randomization design [10]. Ware’s con-
cern that “continuing to randomize infants when accumu-
lating evidence strongly suggested the superiority of one
treatment” unduly deprives subjects of potential beneficial
experimental interventions [10] is mirrored in the com-
mentary on ethical problems in CRTs.
Similarly, Shaw and Chalmers (1970) raise ethical con-
cerns about the data accumulation problem akin to those
raised in the CRT literature. They argue that physician-
researchers can offer patients trial enrollment only when
they are uncertain about the merits of one intervention
over another. However, this uncertainty is often dis-
turbed before a trial can be undertaken [11]. Clinical
trials are developed to investigate the success of treat-
ments which show promise in pilot trials; however, suc-
cessful preliminary results worth testing in clinical trials
seem to disturb an investigator’s uncertainty before
potential subjects could be approached for enrollment.
In other words, the accumulated data from pilot trials
provide physician-researchers with good reason to believe
in the success of the new intervention [11]. As a result, a
physician-researcher is ethically required to provide
patients with the superior treatment.
Furthermore, the data accumulating during a trial raise
ethical concerns. During the course of a trial, the accu-
mulating data often show a tendency for one intervention
to be more successful than another. These data may pro-
vide a physician-researcher with reason to believe in the
superiority of one treatment. However, knowing about
the superior treatment makes it impossible for the trial
to proceed ethically [11]. As a result, ethical concerns
seem to suggest that randomization must stop before a
trial has run to completion [11]. In short, the ethical diffi-
culties raised by harm-benefit assessments in CRTs are
reflected in the early literature on the ethics of RCTs.
Moral solution in RCTs: clinical equipoise
Given the similarity between the ethical problems raised
by harm-benefit assessments in RCTs and CRTs, we look
to the literature addressing the ethics of RCTs to inform
our analysis of harm-benefit assessments in CRTs. The
ethical problems raised in the early literature on RCTs
are addressed by Freedman’s notion of clinical equipoise.
Clinical equipoise exists when there is a state of honest,
professional disagreement in the community of expert
practitioners as to the preferred treatment [3]. In other
words, the ethical permissibility of comparing interven-
tions in RCTs depends on disagreement among expert
practitioners about the relative merits of the treatment
alternatives. The existence of a state of clinical equipoise
is a necessary ethical condition for the commencement
of a trial.
Clinical equipoise is a necessary condition for the ethi-
cal justification of an RCT; however, it is not a sufficient
condition. Clinical equipoise describes the conditions
under which a research ethics committee can approve a
trial but it does not fully explain a physician-researcher’s
duty of care to patients who have been identified,
approached, asked for participation or enrolled in a trial.
A physician-researcher’s duty of care to patients also
relies on a clinical judgment principle, which provides
additional protections for patients involved in research
[12]. According to the clinical judgment principle, a phy-
sician-researcher may not offer a patient enrollment or
continued participation in a trial when the physician
judges that it would be medically irresponsible to do so,
and the evidence for this judgment is likely to be convin-
cing to colleagues [12].
The clinical judgment principle requires physician-
researchers to continue to exercise their professional
judgment about particular patients. Consequently, it
mitigates the concern that clinical equipoise seems to
permit a physician-researcher to randomize a patient
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judgment. Thus, the ethical justification of a trial relies
on both the existence of a state of clinical equipoise and
physician decision making in accordance with the clini-
cal judgment principle. Clinical equipoise provides the
moral guidance for an ethics committee and the clinical
judgment principle guides physician-researchers in their
decisions regarding the enrollment and continuation of
particular patients in research.
Clinical equipoise is one of the most fundamental and
widely cited concepts in research ethics. The central
importance of clinical equipoise can be seen in its pro-
minent appearance in the research ethics literature and
in policies and guidelines governing the protection of
human subjects in research [12]. For example, the U.S.
National Bioethics Advisory Commission’s recommenda-
tions for reform of federal regulations prescribing stan-
dards for institutional review boards (IRBs) recommends
the use of clinical equipoise as a central concept in
harm-benefit assessments [12,13]. In addition, clinical
equipoise is centrally involved in controversial debates.
For example, both critics and proponents of the use of
placebos in HIV research in developing countries cite
clinical equipoise as a moral requirement [14,15]. The
requirement for clinical equipoise has become widely
accepted as the moral justification for random treatment
assignment in RCTs [12].
Clinical equipoise is widely endorsed and applied in the
justification of RCTs; however, it has also been the center
of controversy in the research ethics literature. Commen-
tators disagree as to whether the concept of clinical equi-
poise is useful for the ethical justification of a trial, and
they differ as to whose uncertainty ought to define the
state of equipoise. Franklin Miller and Howard Brody
reject the utility of clinical equipoise. They argue that clin-
ical research and clinical practice have fundamentally dif-
ferent goals and that the rules governing each should not
overlap [16]. On this understanding of clinical research,
there is no fiduciary relationship between a physician-
researcher and a patient-subject. Miller and Brody con-
clude that clinical equipoise–which is rooted in the duty
of care a physician-researcher owes to a patient-subject–
confuses the ethics of clinical practice with clinical
research; it is unnecessary and should be abandoned [16].
Paul Miller and Charles Weijer have responded to
Miller and Brody’s argument by pointing out that many
norms–such as the prohibition of murder and fraud–
apply across diverse activities [17]. Further, denying that
physicians have obligations to patients during research
requires a difficult and undesirable kind of moral disso-
ciation for physicians; they must ignore their profes-
sional obligations to their patients during research [17].
Moreover, Miller and Weijer have articulated a moral
and legal foundation for the existence of a fiduciary
relationship–and corresponding duty of care–between
physician-researchers and patient-subjects [17,18].
Another group of scholars endorses clinical equipoise
but offers diverse interpretations about its meaning.
Within this group, some commentators interpret equi-
poise as an evidentiary standard while others interpret
equipoise as uncertainty. The latter group, as elucidated
by Djulbegovic, understands equipoise as existing at
multiple levels [19]. For example, equipoise may exist at
the level of subjects [20], physicians [21] or the commu-
nity [22,23]. These different levels of equipoise may
motivate different questions concerning the ethical justi-
fication of research [19]. However, in the current paper,
clinical equipoise is understood as an evidentiary stan-
dard that provides guidance to research ethics commit-
tees. A critical exchange concerning the merits of
different interpretations of clinical equipoise can be
found elsewhere in the research ethics literature [24].
Clinical equipoise helps to resolve the ethical tensions
raised by harm-benefit assessments in RCTs by provid-
ing a principled justification for the ethical permissibility
of a trial. More specifically, it provides research ethics
committees and researchers with procedural and sub-
stantive guidelines for their decision-making processes.
Procedurally, a research ethics committee determines
whether clinical equipoise obtains by analyzing the
study protocol and justification, reviewing relevant lit-
erature, and, if necessary, by consulting with indepen-
dent clinical experts [2]. Moreover, meeting the moral
requirement of clinical equipoise requires that research
ethics committees determine whether there is sufficient
warrant to expose people to an experimental interven-
tion and whether the proposed trial exposes subjects in
the control arm to the risk of substandard intervention.
The moral requirement for clinical equipoise is met if
the research ethics committee finds that the evidence
supporting the various treatment options is sufficient
that, were it widely known, expert practitioners would
disagree about the preferred treatment [2].
Clinical equipoise helps to resolve many of the ethical
problems raised by RCTs. For example, it provides a
procedure for establishing whether Ware’s concern that
a trial with a control group would unduly deprive con-
trol group subjects of the benefits of an experimental
treatment is justified. More specifically, if a research
ethics committee establishes that other expert practi-
tioners have good grounds to believe that standard
treatment is preferable to the experimental treatment,
then control subjects would not be unduly disadvan-
taged in being deprived of the experimental interven-
tion. In other words, control and intervention groups
would both receive competent medical care.
Similarly, clinical equipoise provides a solution to
Shaw and Chalmers’ data accumulation problem [11].
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of a trial may seem to favor one treatment over another,
clinical equipoise persists until the results are powerful
enough to influence the judgment of the community of
experts. Once the accumulating data are sufficient to
disturb equipoise, the trial should be stopped. This type
of evidence is most often generated at the end of a trial.
It is widely recognized that decisions for early termina-
tion of a trial based on interim results are complicated
[25]. Trends favoring one intervention over another
often emerge early in a trial only to disappear later in
the trial. As a result, overreacting to emerging or non-
emerging trends in interim outcomes can result in
incorrect conclusions [25].
Consequently, when accumulating evidence suggests
t h es u p e r i o r i t yo fo n ei n t e r v e n t i o n ,i tm a yb ee t h i c a l l y
permissible to continue a trial to completion given that
the evidence necessary to disturb equipoise is most
often generated only at the end of a trial. Finally, meet-
ing the requirement of clinical equipoise ensures that all
arms of a trial are consistent with competent medical
care, defined as practices accepted by the community of
medical experts [17].
Does clinical equipoise apply to CRTs?
Freedman’s clinical equipoise helps to resolve the ethical
tensions associated with harm-benefit assessments and
provides a principled ethical foundation for the permissi-
bility of RCTs. As a result, a concept like clinical equi-
poise could help to resolve the similar ethical concerns in
CRTs. However, it is not clear that clinical equipoise can
be applied to CRTs. In the following section, we explore
the challenges in applying clinical equipoise to CRTs.
The central challenge in applying clinical equipoise to
CRTs stems from the origins of clinical equipoise in the
duty of care a physician-researcher owes to all patient-sub-
jects. Clinical equipoise is commonly understood as emer-
ging from the relationship between a physician-researcher
and a patient-subject [17]. On this understanding, clinical
equipoise presupposes and requires the existence of rela-
tionships between physician-researchers and patient-sub-
jects. Unlike RCTs, CRTs often involve no such
relationships and as such, clinical equipoise is not
obviously applicable as a moral requirement for CRTs.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship
between physician-researchers and patient-subjects will
help to elucidate why clinical equipoise is commonly
thought to emerge only from the relationship between a
physician-researcher and a patient-subject.
The relationship between physician-researchers and
patient-subjects is best understood as a fiduciary relation-
ship [18,26,27]. Fiduciary relationships are a distinctive
type of trust relationship characterized by inequality [18].
In these relationships, one party (the beneficiary) lacks
the abilities necessary to effectively protect and promote
his or her own interests and consequently entrusts a
more powerful party (the fiduciary) with discretionary
p o w e ro v e rt h eb e n e f i c i a r y ’s practical interests [12]. As a
result of this entrustment, the beneficiary becomes
dependent on the judgment and care of the fiduciary.
The beneficiary’s authorization of power and subsequent
vulnerability gives rise to a set of obligations on the part
of the fiduciary. The fiduciary must protect and promote
the interests of the beneficiary [12]. In short, a fiduciary
relationship can be understood as a trust relationship in
which one party authorizes another with discretionary
powers to act in the other’s best interests.
The relationship between a physician-researcher and a
patient-subject demonstrates the characteristics of a fidu-
ciary relationship [18]. Patient-subjects lack medical
knowledge and prescribing powers; as such, they do not
possess the requisite knowledge and ability to ensure that
they receive competent medical care [18]. To receive
competent medical care, they entrust a fiduciary with
more medical knowledge (in this case, the physician-
researcher) with discretionary power over their medical
interests. This entrustment makes the patient-subject
vulnerable and dependent on the judgment and discre-
tion of the physician-researcher. For example, a patient-
subject’s ability to receive competent medical care while
participating in a trial is contingent on a physician-
researcher’s judgment regarding protocol development,
treatment administration, and withdrawal from a study.
By consenting to participate in a study, a patient-subject
entrusts his or her practical interests to the discretionary
power of a physician-researcher and trusts that the physi-
cian-researcher will protect and promote these interests
to the greatest extent possible within the confines of the
research design [18]. As a result of this entrustment, a
physician-researcher incurs obligations to the patient-
subject, including a duty of care.
The origins of clinical equipoise as an obligation emer-
ging from the relationship between a physician-researcher
and a patient-subject interfere with its application to the
resolution of tensions associated with harm-benefit assess-
ments in CRTs. A physician-researcher’so b l i g a t i o nt o
ensure that clinical equipoise obtains is derived from the
duty of care to patient-subjects. As such, clinical equipoise
presupposes the existence of a relationship between a phy-
sician-researcher and a patient-subject. Unlike RCTs,
CRTs may not involve relationships between physician-
researchers and patient-subjects. In CRTs, the units of
randomization are often clinics, schools, hospitals, com-
munities, or physician practices rather than individuals
suffering from particular conditions or disorders.
Furthermore, CRT interventions are often targeted at
health care providers rather than patients and may have
only an indirect impact on patient care. In such instances,
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is not clear whether the patients of health care providers
participating in a CRT need necessarily be considered
research subjects. In the above mentioned cases, there is
no obvious fiduciary relationship between the physician-
researcher and the patient-subject. Consequently, clinical
equipoise, which is rooted in the obligations of physician-
researchers to individual patient-subjects, is not obviously
applicable to CRTs.
Solutions in the CRT literature
If clinical equipoise is not applicable to CRTs, then what
criteria can be used to ensure that groups and indivi-
duals are exposed to benefits and harms that stand in
reasonable relation while participating in CRTs? Several
solutions have been proposed to resolve the ethical ten-
sions arising in CRTs; however, these proposals seem
lacking.
To recall, the central ethical problems associated with
harm-benefit assessments raised in the CRT literature
include the morally appropriate treatment of subjects in
the control group of CRTs, and the data accumulation
problem. Commentators have proposed three broad solu-
tions to these problems. With respect to concerns about
the treatment of control group subjects, commentators
have argued that the ethical treatment of control group
subjects requires that they be provided with a minimal
amount of the experimental intervention and that
delayed implementation of the experimental intervention
can resolve ethical concerns about undue deprivation of
experimental interventions. With respect to the data
accumulation problem, commentators have argued that
early stopping rules in CRTs can help to resolve ethical
concerns about data favoring the experimental treatment
generated during a trial. We proceed by critically analyz-
ing these solutions before providing our own.
The first solution proposes to redress injustices created
by withholding the experimental intervention from con-
trol group subjects by providing control groups with a
“minimal level of intervention” [6,8]. According to Glanz
and colleagues, “the use of a minimal intervention such
as an educational brochure may provide an acceptable
level of benefit”[6].
It is not clear that providing a minimal level of benefit
to control group subjects can help to ensure the ethical
requirement for a reasonable balance of harms and bene-
fits. The authors provide an example of an educational
brochure; however, they neglect to provide a definition
for a “minimal level of benefit”. As such, it is difficult to
infer what types of interventions would be sufficient to
ensure an ethically appropriate balance of harms and
benefits in other CRTs. Furthermore, no argument is
provided for why a minimal level of benefit is the appro-
priate amount. Without a principled argument, it is
difficult to understand why this solution results in an
ethically appropriate balance between harms and
benefits.
The second solution proposes that innovative trial
designs in which all subjects eventually receive the
experimental intervention can provide subjects in CRTs
with a reasonable balance of harms and benefits. Com-
mentators claim that harm-benefit ratios are reasonable
if the control group receives the experimental interven-
tion during a later phase or at the conclusion of a trial
[6,8]. Similarly, commentators have suggested that ethi-
cal concerns about the treatment of subjects in the con-
trol group can be resolved by using a stepped wedge
design, in which an intervention is provided sequentially
to individual subjects or clusters over a number of time
periods [29].
These proposals share the common premise that the
ethical requirement to balance harms and benefits of
participation is met as long as research subjects are pro-
vided with the experimental agent at some point during
the trial or after its completion. However, a delayed
implementation design strategy raises both practical and
conceptual difficulties. Practically, it may not be possible
to implement the experimental intervention at a later
point in a trial. If the cluster population is dynamic, as
in an intensive care unit, some patient-subjects may
never have the opportunity to receive the experimental
intervention.
In addition, delayed implementation of an intervention
does not resolve conceptual difficulties. If it is morally
impermissible to deprive subjects of an experimental
intervention, then it is not clear why delaying imple-
mentation of that intervention becomes morally permis-
sible. We are unaware of any ethical argument or
principle justifying the moral permissibility of tempora-
rily depriving patient-subjects of treatments until a sub-
sequent point during or after the trial and no such
argument is proffered by the above authors. As a result,
the success of solutions involving a delayed implementa-
tion design relies on the development of a principled
argument explaining why the provision of delayed treat-
ment offers subjects a reasonable balance of harms and
benefits.
The third solution proposed in the CRT literature
attempts to resolve the data accumulation problem by
implementing early stopping rules in CRTs. While RCTs
are underway, it is common for a data monitoring com-
mittee (an independent committee of experts) to safe-
guard the interests of participants [30]. Traditionally,
standard interim tools were not used in CRTs. Com-
mentators argued that the unique structure of CRTs
inhibits the use of interim tools, that interventions stu-
died in CRTs are benign, and interim tools are conse-
quently unnecessary [30]. However, trial monitoring and
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sary and broadly applicable to CRTs [30].
Glanz and colleagues [6] argue that data monitoring
committees should evaluate the interim results of CRTs
and halt the trials when appropriate. More specifically,
interim results can indicate that a trial should be halted
early because of adverse effects or because of benefits.
According to Glanz and colleagues, when interim results
uncover statistically significant and clinically important
adverse effects disturbing the balance between the risks
and potential benefits of a trial, the trial should be halted
[6]. Conversely, when interim findings indicate some suc-
cess associated with the experimental intervention, a
researcher or data monitoring committee is morally
required to halt the trial early to provide all subjects with
the experimental intervention [6].
Glanz and colleagues’ claim that statistically significant
and clinically important adverse effects indicate that a
CRT should be stopped early is convincing. We agree that
the potential scientific gains of a study cannot justify
exposing research subjects to an unfair balance of harms
and benefits. Furthermore, this belief is reflected in widely
accepted guidelines governing the ethics of research with
humans. For example, the Declaration of Helsinki indi-
cates that “physicians must immediately stop a study when
the risks are found to outweigh the potential benefits” [4].
However, it is less clear that interim findings indicating
the superiority of one treatment over another require that
a trial be halted to provide all subjects with the more suc-
cessful intervention. Early stopping based on interim find-
ings may compromise the scientific value of a trial. A
trial’s ability to generate results important enough to con-
tribute to a change in practice most often requires that a
trial run until completion. As a result, it is not clear that
early stopping due to a perceived benefit will promote the
interests of trial subjects or broader public interests. In
short, determining when interim findings indicate that a
C R Ts h o u l dn o tr u nt oc o m p l e t i o nr e q u i r e sa n a l y s i s .A
successful solution must protect research subjects from
undue harm in such a way that permits trials to continue
until the point of clinical importance.
In summary, harm-benefit assessments in CRTs raise
difficult ethical questions that have not been adequately
resolved in the literature on the ethics of CRTs. A prin-
cipled resolution for the ethical problems in CRTs
depends on the applicability of a concept like clinical
equipoise. The following section will explore a more
successful resolution to the ethical problems raised by
harm-benefit assessments in CRTs.
A different solution: the trust relationship
between the state and research subjects
A more successful solution to the analysis of harms and
benefits in CRTs involves a principled moral requirement,
such as clinical equipoise. In the following section, we
argue that the recognition of a new trust relationship can
help to situate clinical equipoise as a moral requirement
applicable to CRTs as well as RCTs. Miller and Weijer
argue that in addition to the trust relationship between
physician-researchers and patients-subjects, there exists a
trust relationship between the state and research subjects
[17]. This trust relationship adds to but does not replace
the fiduciary relationship between physician-researcher
and patient-subject. Furthermore, it is applicable not only
to CRTs but to all clinical trials.
We proceed by elucidating the trust relationship
between the state and research subjects and examining its
implications for harm-benefit assessments in CRTs and
RCTs. The trust relationship between state and research
subjects has two central advantages. First, recognition of
this trust relationship provides a foundation for clinical
equipoise which does not depend on a pre-existing rela-
tionship between a physician-researcher and a patient-sub-
j e c t .A sar e s u l t ,t h i st r u s tr e lationship permits clinical
equipoise to be applied to the resolution of ethical tension
in CRTs. Second, it helps to specify the role and obliga-
tions of research ethics committees in the ethical analysis
of risk in CRT as well as in all RCTs.
The trust relationship between the state and research
subjects stems from the social value of clinical research.
Clinical research contributes to important public goods,
including gains in scientific knowledge and improvements
in the quality of health care. This progress depends on the
continuation of clinical research, which, in turn, relies on
the willingness of citizens to volunteer for research partici-
pation. Citizens who volunteer for research participation
trust that in return for their contribution to the public
good, the state will protect and promote their interests
[17]. The trust placed in the state by citizens in combina-
tion with the public value derived from research participa-
tion incurs a moral obligation on the part of the state to
protect the interests of patient-subjects [17]. To put it
another way, in the same way that the trust based relation-
ship between physician-researchers and patient-subjects
gives rise to obligations for a physician-researcher to act in
the interests of a patient-subject, the trust relationship
between the state and citizens gives rise to an obligation
that the state undertake to protect the interests of indivi-
duals participating in research.
To fulfill its obligation to subjects, the state promulgates
regulations outlining protections for research subjects and
ensures that these regulations are adequately enforced
[17]. Specifically, standards for the scientific and ethical
permissibility of clinical research are outlined in national
guidelines and regulations. These documents delineate the
obligations of various parties in clinical research, including
both institutions and individual physician-researchers. In
addition to these oversight documents, the state enacts
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committees that are charged with the responsibility of
reviewing research proposals to ensure compliance with
national standards. Research ethics committees can be
understood as fulfilling the state’s trust based obligation to
protect the liberty and welfare interests of citizens who
participate in clinical research [17]. Research ethics com-
mittees fulfill this function, in part, by trying to establish a
reasonable balance between the harms and benefits of a
trial.
Why recognize an additional trust relationship between
the state and research subjects? Decisions about whether
or not a trial should proceed are determined during
ethics review, which is prior to the existence of any rela-
tionship between a physician-researcher and patient-sub-
ject [17]. At this stage, potential patient-subjects have not
been approached regarding study participation; there
exist no current relationships but only potential future
relationships between physician-researchers and patient-
subjects. Consequently, the interests of particular
patient-subjects are not yet in view. Although the inter-
ests of particular individuals are not yet in view and there
are no already existing relationships between physician-
researchers and patient-subjects, the ethical conduct of
clinical research requires that there be safeguards for the
interests of prospective patient-subjects.
Recognizing the trust relationship between the state and
research subjects provides a mechanism for justifying pro-
tections for research subjects prospectively. In this frame-
work, research ethics committees are responsible for
protecting the interests of future patient-subjects [17]. This
prospective review includes, but is not limited to, scrutiniz-
ing a study for scientific validity, evaluating the recruitment
and enrollment criteria, and verifying that adequate proce-
dures are in place to secure informed consent [17].
In summary, ethics review occurs prior to the existence
of any particular relationship between a physician-
researcher and patient-subject and also to CRTs, in
which there may be no physician-researcher and patient-
subject relationship. Consequently, research ethics com-
mittees play a central role in fulfilling the state’s obliga-
tion to protect the interests of patient-subjects. In short,
the trust relationship between the state and research sub-
jects helps to explain the moral obligations of the state as
well as researchers to subjects in RCTs and in CRTs.
Advantages of the trust relationship between
state and research subjects
The trust relationship between the state and research
subjects has two central advantages. First, it provides a
framework that defines the obligations owed to prospec-
tive research subjects at the stage of ethics review. As
such, it explains the central role of research ethics com-
mittees in protecting subjects. Second, and of central
importance to our argument, recognizing the trust rela-
tionship between the state and research subjects situates
clinical equipoise within a framework applicable to
CRTs.
To recall, the problem in applying clinical equipoise to
CRTs stems from the understanding of clinical equipoise
as an obligation of a physician-researcher to a patient-sub-
ject by virtue of the fiduciary relationship. CRTs often
involve no relationship between physician-researchers and
patient-subjects and, consequently, clinical equipoise does
not obviously fit into this framework. Recognizing an inde-
pendent trust-relationship between the state and research
subjects situates clinical equipoise within a framework that
does not rely on the relationship between a physician-
researcher and patient-subject. As such, it may be relevant
to the ethics of harm-benefit assessments in CRTs.
How does clinical equipoise fit into the trust relationship
between the state and research subjects? The trust rela-
tionship between the state and a group or community of
research subjects gives rise to obligations on the part of
the state to protect the welfare interests of research sub-
jects. More specifically, patient-subjects have interests in
receiving competent medical care. This interest gives rise
to a parallel obligation on the part of the state to ensure
this protection. To put it another way, as a result of the
trust relationship, the state incurs a duty of care towards
research subjects. Clinical equipoise emerges as the speci-
fication of the duty of care between the state and research
subjects. The ethical requirement of clinical equipoise
helps to ensure that all research subjects in a trial will
receive competent medical care.
To summarize, when understood as the specification of
the state’s duty of care towards research subjects, clinical
equipoise is applicable as a moral requirement for CRTs.
Prior to and during these trials, research ethics commit-
tees and data monitoring committees help to ensure that
clinical equipoise obtains. The implications of the trust
relationship between the state and research subjects are
important. It helps to resolve ethical questions associated
with prospective ethics review in RCTs as well as CRTs,
and situates clinical equipoise within a framework applic-
able to harm-benefit assessments in CRTs. In this frame-
work, research ethics committees and data monitoring
committees, in addition to individual physician-research-
ers, can partially fulfill their ethical obligations towards
research subjects by ensuring that clinical equipoise
obtains.
Implications for harm-benefit assessments in CRTs
Interpreting clinical equipoise as a moral requirement
relevant to CRTs provides research ethics committees
with a principled way of establishing when it is permis-
sible to expose subjects in CRTs to an experimental
intervention. As such, it can help provide successful
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literature concerning the treatment of subjects in con-
trol groups and the accumulating data during a CRT.
First, clinical equipoise can help to resolve concerns
about unduly depriving control group subjects in CRTs
of potentially effective experimental interventions. Glanz
and colleagues raise concerns about control group sub-
jects undergoing risks of harm or inconvenience without
receiving the benefits of the experimental intervention
[6]. Clinical equipoise helps to resolve this tension by
providing a clear criterion for the ethical treatment of
all research subjects. According to clinical equipoise,
exposing subjects to experimental interventions is
morally permissible if the evidence supporting the pro-
posed interventions is sufficient that, were it widely
known, expert clinicians would disagree about the pre-
ferred treatment [3]. The disagreement amongst the
relevant community of experts helps to ensure that the
effects of the experimental intervention, whether posi-
tive or negative, are not known prior to the trial. With-
out convincing evidence for the beneficial effects of an
intervention (which is usually generated at the end of a
trial) control group subjects are not being deprived of
an intervention known to be effective. In other words,
the control group does not receive substandard treat-
ment as long as there is disagreement among the com-
munity of expert practitioners about whether the
experimental or control intervention is preferable.
Second, Glanz and colleagues argue that when interim
analysis shows an improvement in psychosocial or medical
outcomes associated with an intervention, “it would then
be reasonable to offer the more effective strategy to all
communities or participants” [6]. However, this suggestion
interferes with a trial’s ability to generate useful results.
Clinical equipoise resolves this tension without sacrificing
the treatment of research subjects or the scientific utility
of a trial. While data accumulating prior to and during the
course of a trial may seem to favor one treatment over
another, clinical equipoise persists until the results are
powerful enough to influence the judgment of the com-
munity of experts. This type of evidence is most often gen-
erated at the end of a trial. As a result, in spite of
accumulating evidence suggesting the superiority of the
experimental intervention, researchers are ethically justi-
fied in continuing a trial to completion.
Example CRT
In addition to resolving some of the ethical tensions
raised in the literature on CRTs, clinical equipoise pro-
vides research ethics committees with formal and proce-
dural guidelines for harm-benefit assessments. Through
an analysis of the following example, we will demon-
strate how clinical equipoise can help to resolve ethical
tensions and ambiguity in the assessment of harms and
benefits in CRTs.
In one example of a CRT, villages in rural Uganda were
randomized either to have or not to have access to group
interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) for depression [31].
Within the villages selected for participation, eligible
study participants either self-identified or were identified
by others as having symptoms of depression and were
assessed according to the diagnostic criteria described in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV). Subjects in villages
assigned to the intervention arm received weekly ninety-
minute sessions of interpersonal psychotherapy for six-
teen weeks [31]. Subjects in villages assigned to the con-
trol group received no intervention beyond what was
already available to them in their villages. The goals of
the study were to test the efficacy of group IPT in redu-
cing symptoms of depression in Uganda and assess the
feasibility of depression studies in Uganda [31].
For a CRT to offer a reasonable balance of harms and
b e n e f i t s ,i tm u s tm e e tt h er e q u irements of clinical equi-
poise. To determine whether this CRT meets the require-
ments of clinical equipoise, the trial investigators and
research ethics committee, should ask the following
questions. Is the evidence supporting the experimental
treatment sufficient that, were it widely known, expert
practitioners would disagree about the preferred treat-
ment? Are control communities unduly deprived of the
experimental treatment?
With respect to this trial, the investigators and research
ethics committee should first ask if the evidence support-
ing the efficacy of group IPT in treating depression in
Uganda is sufficient that, were it widely known, expert
practitioners would disagree over the efficacy of this
intervention? In order for this trial to be ethically permis-
sible, a research ethics committee must find it reasonable
to answer yes to this question. The investigators point
out that substantial evidence exists, demonstrating the
success of psychotherapy in reducing symptoms of
depression in developed countries [31], which provides
reason to believe that, if implemented successfully, group
IPT could prove beneficial to the population of the host
country.
However, the local conditions in sub-Saharan Africa
and those in which group IPT was developed differ dra-
matically and these variations may complicate the suc-
cessful implementation of the therapeutic strategies
required for group IPT [31]. For example, local commu-
nities are often hesitant to communicate directly about
sensitive issues. This poses a difficult obstacle for psy-
chotherapy, which relies on discussion therapy [31]. In
short, evidence exists suggesting the potential success of
group IPT in reducing symptoms of depression; however,
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in sub-Saharan Africa are questionable. To put it another
way, experts would likely disagree over the success or fea-
sibility of implementing IPT in sub-Saharan Africa,
thereby meeting one moral requirement of clinical
equipoise.
The second question investigators and research ethics
committees should ask is whether the control commu-
nities are being unduly deprived of group IPT in this trial?
Undue deprivation of an experimental intervention occurs
if a patient-subject’s participation in a trial restricts access
to therapies which would otherwise be available as part of
standard care. At the outset of the trial, the standard of
care for treating depression in sub-Saharan Africa did not
include psychotherapy. Traditional healers were available
to village inhabitants who sought their expertise; however,
there was no intervention typically administered for the
treatment of depression. Control group subjects were not
discouraged from visiting traditional healers or taking any
measures available to them to relieve their depression [31].
Instead, the trial sought to measure the success of group
IPT in comparison with the usual treatment [31]. Given
that subjects were not denied standard treatment available
in Uganda and that the efficacy of group IPT remains
uncertain in these populations, control subjects were not
unduly deprived of the experimental intervention. In other
words, it seems reasonable for a research ethics committee
to find that this CRT meets the moral requirement of clin-
ical equipoise.
Conclusion
Harm-benefit assessments raise difficult problems for
CRTs. These problems resemble the ethical problems in
RCTs that are resolved by clinical equipoise; however,
the unique structure of CRTs resists the application of
clinical equipoise as the moral principle for harm-benefit
assessments. Problems in applying clinical equipoise to
CRTs arise from the origins of clinical equipoise as a
duty of care emerging from the fiduciary relationship
between physician-researchers and patient-subjects. We
argue that situating clinical equipoise within a trust rela-
tionship between the state and a community of subjects
provides a framework in which clinical equipoise can be
applied to CRTs. Finally, applying clinical equipoise to
the ethical analysis of risk in CRTs can help to resolve
the tensions arising in harm-benefit assessments and pro-
vide research ethics committees with criteria for the ethi-
cal treatment of subjects in control and experimental
arms of a trial.
Note
We have created a Wiki webpage to facilitate an open
discussion about the ideas expressed in this and other
papers published in the series on ethical issues in CRTs.
Please enter your thoughts and comments at http://
crtethics.wikispaces.com.
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